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I. INTRODUCTION

The lEN Request for Proposals (RFP) promised a fair competitive bidding process for the
lEN Project that would be conducted in accordance with the law. Syringa entered into an
agreement withE-Rate educational services provider ENA to cooperate in that process by the
submission of a responsive proposal. As a part of that agreement, Syringa provided firm prices
for its connectivity services to ENA in exchange for ENA's agreement to usc Syringa
exclusively if it received a contract for the Project.
ENA built on the firm prices provided by Syringa to prepare and submit the highest
ranked, lowest cost lEN proposal and received a statewide blanket purchase order (SBPO) from
the Department of Administration (DOA) for the Project. Second place Qwest, which knew "all
along that we would be providing connectivity", received an identical SBPO.
Pressured by the State Respondents and Qwest following the issuance of the SBPOs,
ENA breached its agreement with Syringa by agreeing to an illegal ''split" of the lEN Project
resulting from amended SBPOs that allocated specialized E-Rate services to ENA but gave IEN
connectivity exclusively to Qwest.
Syringa received nothing as a result of its agreement with ENA. Qwest received all the
IE!\ connectivity that ENA had agreed to obtain from Syringa and the State Respondents

manipulated the competitive bidding process with apparent impunity.
Syringa sued DOA to test the legality of the amended SBPOs, sued ENA for breach of
contract and sued Qwcst and the State Respondents for interfering with the competitive bidding
process and Syringa's contract with ENA.
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The district court dismissed all of Syringa's claims at summary judgment The case is
now before this Court for de novo review.
The purposes of this Reply Brief are:
1.

To demonstrate that the issuance of the amended SBPOs that split the IEN Project
into separate contracts for dissimilar services violated Idaho Code§ 67-5718A
that Syringa has standing to vindicate:

2.

To show why the Teaming Agreement between Syringa and ENA was an
enforceable contract that was breached by ENA;

3.

To identify principles of law and disputes of material fact that preclude the
dismissal of Syringa's interference claims;

4.

To reply to the Respondents' arguments concerning attorneys fees.
II. ARGUMENT

A.

The Split Of The lEN Project Was A Fundamental Violation Of Idaho Law That
Syringa Has Standing To Vindicate.

Syringa has consistently claimed that the amended SBPOs are unlawful because they
violate Idaho Code§ 67-5718A. (Complaint, Count Two, ,1~ 69-76, R. pp. 29-30 and Count
Three,~~

77-94, R. pp. 30-33; Motion for Order to Show Cause and supporting materials,

R. 00563 - 00688; Syringa's Opening Brief, pp. 32-36 and 48-51.)
ENA accepts the amended SBPOs at face value, claims they were unilaterally imposed,
and asserts that "the State reserved the right to split the award". (ENA's Amended Brief, pp. 3,
16 and 22.) Qwest accepted the benefits of the amended SBPOs which it also claims were
unilaterally imposed by DOA. The State Respondents, on the other hand, provide no substantive
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defense of the amended SBPOs but attack Syringa's standing to assert that the amended SBPOs
violate Idaho Code§ 67-5718A. (State Respondents' Brief, p. 25.)
The district court was diverted from reviewing the legality of the amended SBPOs by its
erroneous conclusion that Syringa was barred by a failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
The issue is now squarely before this Court.
1.

The Amended SBPOs Split the lEN Project.

It is undisputed that the amended SBPOs split the lEN Project into two contracts for

dissimilar services. The State Respondents admit this fact in their Counterstatement of Facts:
On February 26, 2009, IDA issued Amendment 1 to SBPO 1308 and
Amendment 1 to SBPO 1309. Id. at 588-593. Each Amendment
stated: "It is the intent ofthe State ofldaho to amend SBPO 1308
[SBPO 1309] to clarify the rules and responsibilities of the parties to
the agreement." !d. at 588 and 592. Each amendment also stated:
"The State considers Qwest and ENA equal partners in the lEN
Project as demonstrated in the Intent to Award Letter dated January
20,2009 and the subsequent SBPO 1308 [SBPO 1309] dated January
28, 2009." Id. at 589 and 593. The Amendments clarify the scope of
work for both Qwest and ENA, such that Qwest would be the general
contractor in coordination with ENA, for all lEN technical network
services, and ENA will be the Service Provider listed on the State's
federal E-Rate Form 4 71 and will coordinate delivery of all lEN
network services and support. Id. 588 and 592. (State Respondents'
Brief, pp. 6-7.)
ENA also admits that the amended SBPOs split the lEN Project, stating:
The State did not award the lEN alliance the lEN contract; instead, it
unilaterallv decided to solit the award between ENA (forE-rate) and
Qwest (for connectivity). (ENA's Amended Brief, p. 3; See also, pp.
7, 8, 9, 20, 24-25 and 27)
-..F

-1.

'

/

The State Respondents and ENA admit the lEN Project was split into dissimilar contracts, and
the State Respondents also admit that Syringa was harmed as a result, stating:
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The effect of Amendment 1 to SBPO 1308 and to SBPO 1309 was to
assign to Qwest the "entire scope of work assigned to Syringa in the
Teaming Agreement and the lEN Alliance Proposal." !d. at 1144.
(State Respondents' Brief, p.7.)
Qwest makes no effort to defend the legality of the amended SBPOs and offers no
opposition to the conclusion that the amended SBPOs split the lEN Project into two separate
contracts for dissimilar services.
2.

The Amended SBPOs Violate Idaho Law and Damaged Syringa.

The Idaho competitive bidding process is described in detail in Idaho Code§§ 67-5715
through 67-5740. These statutes govern bid specifications, the solicitation ofbids, protest of
specifications, the selection of the lowest responsible bidder, multiple awards and the initial
issuance of state contracts. These statutes also provide, as demonstrated in Syringa's Opening
Brief, that it is unlawful for the State to award multiple contracts for dissimilar property to
multiple bidders following competitive bidding. (Idaho Code§ 67-5718A, Syringa's Opening
Brief, pp. 49-51.)
Existing law becomes part of the contract that results from an RFP and an accepted bid.
See, e.g., Primary Health Network, Inc. v. State of Idaho, Department ofAdministration, 137

Idaho 663,667, 52 P.3d 307,311 (2002). Idaho Code§ 67-5718A was part of the law in
existence in Idaho at the time of the lEN RFP, the Letter oflntent and the original SBPOs to
ENA and to Qwest. Idaho Code§ 67-5718A authorizes awards and contracts to multiple bidders
for the "same or similar property" in specific circumstances and subject to express conditions. It
does not, however, authorize multiple awards for dissimilar property or "split" awards.
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3.

Syringa Has Standing to Challenge the Amended SBPOs.

Neither Qwest nor ENA dispute Syringa's standing to challenge the amended SBPOs.
The State Respondents discuss federal and state procurement cases supportive of the principle
that disappointed bidders do not have standing to challenge an award absent authorizing
legislation, but ultimately acknowledge that statutory law in the relevant jurisdiction usually
controls. (State Respondents' Brief, pp. 10-15.) The applicable statute in this case is Idaho
Code§ 10-1202.
Subject to the constitutional "case or controversy" requirements of standing, Idaho Code
§ 10-1202 provides access to the courts for persons whose rights are affected by contract, statute,
franchise and/or similar relations. It states:
Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other
writings constituting a contract or any oral contract, or whose rights,
status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal
ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of
construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute,
ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights,
status or other legal relations thereunder.
Syringa is such a "person" and this case satisfies the "case or controversy" requirement
addressed in Young v. City ofKetchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104,44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002); see also
Scott v. Buhl Joint School District, 123 Idaho 779, 852 P.2d 1376 (1993). Syringa, as a
subcontractor to ENA, incurred an admitted injury in fact that is directly related to the unlawful
split of the lEN Project. The district court properly ruled that Syringa has constitutional standing
to bring this action. (Memorandum Decision and Order, R. 1139-1159 and 1149-1153.)
The State Respondents offer three faulty administrative law based theories against
Syringa's standing to challenge the unlawful amended lEN SBPOs.
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1.

Syringa cannot challenge the amended SBPOs because it failed to protest the lEN
RFP multiple award specifications (State Respondents' Brief, pp. 13-22);

2.

Syringa cannot challenge the amended SBPOs because it failed to protest the
January 20, 2009 Notice oflntent (State Respondents· Brief, pp. 22-25);

3.

Syringa's contention that Idaho Code§ 67-5733(1 )(c) provides no post-contract
administrative remedy is an irrelevant red herring (State Respondents' Brief,
p. 25).

Each of these theories is based on the false premise that Syringa failed to exhaust an available
administrative remedy.

(a)

Syringa's Standing is Not Defeated by Failure to Challenge the lEN
Bid Specifications.

Syringa does not challenge the lEN bid specifications that lawfully provided the
lEN Project could be the subject of a multiple award. Nonetheless, the State Respondents
argue, based upon a misconstruction of Counts 2 and 3 of Syringa's Complaint, that
Syringa lacks standing because it failed to protest the specifications of the lEN RFP.
(State Respondents Brief, pp. 21-22, 25.) The State Respondents are wrong.
Count Two of Syringa's Complaint alleges, in relevant part, that the "amended lEN
purchase orders" (amended SBPOs) violated Idaho Code§ 67-5718A, and that Gwartney and/or
Zickau conspired with Qwest, in violation ofldaho Code § 67-5726, to exclude Syringa from
participating in the lEN. Count Three of Syringa's Complaint alleges that the amended SBPOs
violated Idaho Code§ 67-5718A and seeks a declaratory judgment declaring the amended
SBPOs void. Neither Count Two nor Count Three mentions or challenges the lEN
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specifications. (R. 28-33, Complaint, Counts Two and

Three,~~

62-94.) Syringa contends the

specifications to RFP 02160 support the making of a lawful I. C. § 67-5718A multiple award.
Syringa's Complaint concerns the unlawful split that resulted from the amended SBPOs.
The State Respondents' contention that Syringa has no standing to challenge the amended
SBPOs because its Complaint challenges the legality of the multiple award under the lEN RFP
specifications is not true, is not supported by the Complaint or the Record and has no merit.
(b)

Syringa' Standing Is Not Defeated by Failure to Challenge the
Multiple Award of January 20,2009.

The multiple award to ENA and Qwest was announced by the DOA on January 20,2009.
Neither Syringa nor ENA protested the multiple award or claimed that ENA was the "lowest
responsible bidder" under Idaho Code§ 67-5733(1)(c). Neither Syringa nor ENA had reason to
protest because the January 20, 2009 Letter oflntent (R. 581) gives no indication that the lEN
Project would be unlawfully split into two contracts for dissimilar property in violation ofldaho
Code§ 67-5718A. Notably, Mr. Gwartney admitted that he knew that the project would be split,
admitted that the Letter of Intent said nothing about the project being split, and did nothing to
advise the bidders the award would be split before the appeal time had run:
Q.
Okay. Would you agree that the lEN project and the contracts
that were ultimately let, in simple terms, involve E-Rate and
connectivity as two separate elements?
A.

I would agree that those are two critical elements, yes.

Q.
Okay. And one of those elements was, according to this split,
to be provided by ENA?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And that was theE-Rate component; correct?
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A

Among other things, but that was their special skill, yeah.

Q.
Okay. And it was the connectivity component -- that is,
actually making the connections and providing the broadband that
was to be exclusively Qwest under this bid split?
Qwest and/or whoever they authorized to work with, whatever
other words there are.

A

Q.
Okay. And that was the intent of the letter of intent dated
January 20, 2009?
A

You're back to Exhibit 27?

Q.

Yes.

A

Yes.

Q.
Where does it say that the award in the contracts would be
split in that fashion on Exhibit 27?
A

It doesn't say that.

Q.
Do you know how the split that you've just described for me,
which generally involves E-Rate going to ENA and Internet
connectivity going to Qwest, was communicated to ENA?
A.

Do I know when?

Q.

How?

A

How? I don't know specifically, no.

(Conf R. 92, Gwartney Depo, p. 159, L. 15 -p. 161, L. 15.)
Syringa does not challenge the Letter of Intent or the identical and lawful SBPOs issued
to Qwest and ENA on January 28, 2009 because they did not split the lEN Project. Syringa
does, however, challenge the unlawful amended SBPOs because they did split the Project.
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(c)

Syringa's Standing Is Not Defeated by the Failure to Challenge the
Amended SBPOs.

Neither Idaho Code § 67-5733 nor any other Idaho purchasing statute provides a postcontract administrative remedy that supplants Syringa's right to bring an action under Idaho
Code § 10-1202. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is not a bar to litigation when, as in
this case, there are no administrative remedies to exhaust. See Fuchs v. State ofldaho,
Department ofldaho State Police, Bureau ofAlcohol Beverage Control, 152 Idaho 626, 272 P.3d

1257 (2012); Lochsa Falls, L.L. C. v. State, 147 Idaho 232, 207 P.3d 9631 (2009); (See also
Opening Brief, pp. 32-36.)
The State Respondents have identified no statute that affords a post-contract amendment
administrative remedy, offered no defense of the district court ruling that the "amendments were
effectively the awards" (R. 1659; Opening Brief, pp. 34-36), and offered no response to
Syringa's analysis other than to caJl it an irrelevant red herring. The State Respondents have, by
their failure to present any authority or analysis on this point, conceded the issue. Syringa had
no administrative remedies to exhaust and clearly has standing to challenge the amended SBPOs.
The summary judgment dismissing Counts Two and Three of Syringa's Complaint
should, therefore, be reversed and the claims remanded.
B.

The Existence and Breach of the Teaming Agreement Present Issues That Can Only
be Resolved by a Jury.
1.

The Teaming Agreement was Complete in its Material Terms.

The Respondents wrongly assert that the Teaming Agreement lacked "definite and
material terms, such as price, and because it expressly contemplated the need to execute a
subsequent agreement." (ENA's Amended Brief, p. 13, Qwest's Brief, pp. 3-5.) The
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Respondents are wrong because the T earning Agreement contained all the material terms,
including a process for establishing Syringa's price to ENA, that were necessary. The
Respondents are also wrong because they conflate Syringa's price to ENA with ENA's price to
the State. (ENA's Amended Brief, p. 14; Qwest's Brief, pp. 3-5, 18-19.)
(a)

The Cost of Syringa's Services to ENA was Firm, was Not Dependent
on EN A's Cost to the State, and Is in the Record.

The Teaming Agreement detailed the obligations ofENA and Syringa with respect to
their joint e±Torts to obtain a prime contract and their respective performance obligations if the
ENA Proposal resulted in a prime contract. Specific pricing did not need to be included within
the four comers of the Teaming Agreement because the "price" for Syringa's connectivity
services to ENA was required to be provided by Syringa to ENA by~ 2(c) of the Teaming
Agreement. That price provided by Syringa on January 8 and 9, 2009 was accepted by ENA and
became a part of the Teaming Agreement. (R. 1794- 1795, Lowe Depo., p. 94, L. 7- p. 95,
L. 22; 1797-1801, LoweDepo., p. 174, L. 21-p. 178, L. 7; AffidavitofKevinJohnson,

R. Conf. pp. 514

582.)

Paragraph 2(c) of the Teaming Agreement required Syringa to "provide such input,
review and information into the Proposal as is required to complete all requirements of the
Request for Proposal." (R. p. 576.) ENA's admission that the Teaming Agreement was
"unquestionably complete concerning the parties' efforts to obtain the prime contract" is an
acknowledgement that it received and used Syringa's pricing in the preparation of its response to
the RFP. (ENA's Amended Brief, p. 18.)
ENA's misdirection on this issue arises from its conflation of the Syringa price to ENA

- 10-

with ENA's price to the State. The two are separate and distinct. Syringa's price to ENA is the
subject ofthe Affidavit of Kevin Johnson (R. Conf. 514-582) and was a firm "wholesale" price
that broke the connectivity services Syringa was to provide to ENA into separately priced
component parts. ENA's price to the State, on the other hand, was a "retail" price for
everything, including E-Rate service required to provide the lEN "end to end" solution. That
price was calculated by ENA.
ENA tries to hide the fact that Syringa's price to ENA was determined as a part of the
preparation and submission ofENA's response to the RFP by stating that the RFP was not
intended to specify the actual needs of the schools for the lEN and, therefore, the total price was
not known. This is true, but irrelevant. ENA's long explanation of the process by which the
amount of services required would be determined (ENA's Amended Brief, pp. 14-15) is
irrelevant because the key element to lEN pricing was not total price, but per unit price. ENA's
explanation is also irrelevant because Syringa's price to ENA was not dependent upon ENA's
price to the State- Syringa was committed to provide as much, or as little connectivity as ENA
required, at its stated price.
Syringa's pricing to ENA consisted of three components (1) backbone; (2) internet
access; and (3) local access or "last mile". Syringa provided ENA a flat rate Non-Recurring
Charge (NRC) of$15,000 and a flat rate Monthly Recurring Charge (MRC) of$83,400 for
backbone and variable, "per unit" rates for internet access and local access to the locations listed
in the RFP as Phase 1 sites. (Affidavit of J. Kevin Johnson, Conf. R. 516; see also Exhibits 3
and 5, Conf. R. 527-533 and 539-582.) The Syringa rate to ENA for internet access was $42.50
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per mbps and the Syringa rate to ENA for local access was contained on two spreadsheets that
addressed NRC and MRC for each lEN location. The flat rates to be charged to ENA for
backbone would start upon the first request for services by EN A. The variable rate to be charged
to ENA for internet access would start upon request by ENA that designated the site and the
amount of capacity desired at $42.50 per mbps. The rate to be charged to ENA for local access
would start on request by ENA to activate a specific lEN location (subject only to downward
adjustment pursuant to Section 3(c) if another provider offered a better price for "last mile").
These firm rates were significantly less and were included within the rates set out in the ENA
Cost Proposal and were not dependent upon the price paid to ENA by the State. (Rex Miller
email string, R. Conf. 139-141.)
Qwest argues that the Teaming Agreement was incomplete because it failed to address
how ENA and Syringa would divide the $571,000 monthly recurring charge. (Qwest's Brief,
p. 19.) As noted above, there was no need for a "division" ofthe $571,000 MRC between ENA
and Syringa. Syringa would be paid, based on the rates it provided to ENA on January 8 and 9,
2009, for the backbone, internet access and local access services it provided to ENA for use by
the lEN. Beyond that, Syringa had no claim to the monies to be paid to ENA by the State. The
$571,000 MRC number was, in short, a number created by ENA to cover the services included
within its response to the RFP.
ENA and Qwest also try to create confusion by suggesting Mr. Lowe testified in
deposition that ENA and Syringa had not agreed on price. (Qwest's brief, pp. 4-5, 19; ENA's
Amended Brief, pp. 13-14.) In fact, Mr. Lowe testified that Syringa gave ENA a fixed price:
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A.
In order to put in a fixed price bid, we had to go out and get
quotes for the last mile. If you look at the pricing schedules that we
gave ENA as part of the RFP response, they're broken down into two
basic categories. One was a core charge. And that core charge is
what we were going to charge ENA for the backbone. And in the
teaming agreement, it was one backbone.
The lion's share of the charge was access charges. And we
went out to the best of our ability to find various suppliers, Qwest
Wholesale, Verizon, Frontier, Cable One, Direct Communications,
anybody and everybody. We went out to find what we believed at
that time the lowest cost last mile. And then we presented that with
our markup as a price to ENA.
So, ENA received core charges and access charges as a part of
the fixed price that we gave them. So, we had a solution and we knew
that the solution would not exceed at least the access charges. But we
left the ability in the teaming agreement for ENA to come back in.
Because this thing -- this thing went from an RFP let of December
15th to an RFP response of January 12th.
Q.

Right.

A.
We had less than a month. We did a lot of work to come up
with what we believed to be the lowest cost. We left the provisions in
the teaming agreement so that once the award was made and once we
initiated on this platform, if ENA could find a cheaper access provider
that was available to them, then great. Syringa Networks would have
first right of refusal if it matched the price, matched the technical
capabilities, et cetera. Those provisions were left in place to protect
Idaho's taxpayers. We went to great length, I went to great length in
my conversations with Jason Kreizenbeck, in the teaming agreement
wording, and intent of what Syringa Networks wanted to do to protect
Idaho's taxpayers.
(Lowe Depo., p. 94, L. 7- p. 95, L. 22; R. 1793-1795.)
Mr. Lowe also testified, consistent with the fixed price given to ENA, that cost was
known; what was not known was the logistics. (Lowe Depo., p. 94, L. 7- p. 95, L. 22; R. 17931795; R. Lowe Depo, p. 174, L. 21 - 178, L. 7; R. 1796-1801.) The subsequent service
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agreement contemplated by the Teaming Agreement "'was for the logistics of what this Teaming
Agreement defined as a work- you know, as a work body should the lEN Alliance win."
The RFP reserved the right to decide the amount of services that would be purchased.
The parties did not know, therefore, how the project would unfold, but they did know the type
and cost of services Syringa was required to make available. The logistics of implementation,
including billing, depended upon how the work would be awarded by the State. To address these
logistics, the Teaming Agreement provided that the parties shall execute a "partnership
agreement as specified in this Agreement that would include any required flow-down provisions
or other appropriate terms similar to those set forth in the prime contract." Syringa's price to
ENA, on the other hand, was known and accepted pursuant to the process required by~ 2(c) of
the Teaming Agreement before the ENA Proposal was submitted. The Respondents' contentions
to the contrary are inconsistent with the record and without merit.
2.

The Certainty of the Material Terms of the Teaming Agreement is :Kot
Defeated by the Absence of Detail on Other, Non-Material Terms.

ENA alleges the Teaming Agreement was incomplete because it did not contain
information about how orders would be placed, how billing would occur, how workflow issues
would be addressed and how labor would be divided. (ENA's Amended Brief, pp. 13-14.) How
labor would be divided and how workflow issues would be handled are, contrary to ENA's
argument, specifically addressed in paragraphs 3.B and 3.C of the Teaming Agreement (R. 576578 at 577). How orders would be placed and how billing would occur are, on the other hand,
logistical terms whose absence does not prevent the enforcement of an agreement.
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A contract must be complete, definite and certain in all its material terms, or contain
provisions which are capable in themselves of being reduced to reasonable certainty. Giacobbi

Square v. PEK Corp., 105 Idaho 346, 348, 670 P.2d 51, 53 (1983); Anderson v. Whipple, 71
Idaho 112, 123, 227 P.2d 351 (1951); Farber v. Dewey-Davis Estate, Inc., 883 Idaho 394, 398,
364 P.2d 173 (1961). The absence of detail in non-material terms, on the other hand, does not
render a contract unenforceable.
This Court addressed similar facts in Barnes v. Huck, 97 Idaho 173, 540 P .2d 13 52
( 197 5), which concerned the enforcement of an oral agreement to pay the purchase price of farm
machinery over time. As here, appellant Huck contended that the contract was so vague,
indefinite and uncertain that it could not be enforced. Huck argued that there was no agreement
(1) whether the balance was to be paid in installments or in a lump sum; (2) when each

installment was due (assuming the balance was to be paid in installments); or (3) upon a final
maturity date for the entire indebtedness to be paid. This Court rejected Huck's arguments and
found that the deferred payment agreement, which was for a specific amount and an interest rate
"equivalent to that charged by the Southern Idaho Production Credit Association" was
sufficiently certain in its terms and requirements to render it enforceable. In so doing, this Court
emphasized that only reasonable certainly is required:
As a general rule if a contract is so vague and indefinite that the intent
of the parties cannot be ascertained therefrom, it is unenforceable. In
applying this rule, COliTIS will])ot hold the contracting parties to a
§t<indard of absolute certainty relative to every detail of a contract.
Rather only reasonable certainty is necessary before a contract will be
given legal effect. (emphasis added).
97 Idaho at 178, 540 P.2d 1357 (1975).
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This Court also explicitly recognized in Huck, supra, that the law "does not favor, but
leans against, the destruction of contracts because of uncertainty, and it will, if feasible, so
construe the agreements to carry into effect the reasonable intentions of the parties if that can be
ascertained." I d., quoting WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 813, § 1424 (3d ed. 1968). If the parties
have expressed their intent to be bound and if the terms are reasonably certain such that the
Court can determine the parties' bargain, the agreement is enforceable. The Teaming Agreement
is such an agreement.

3.

Anticipation of the Need for a Future Service Agreement Does Not Render
the Teaming Agreement Unenforceable.

ENA argues that the T earning Agreement was not complete because it anticipated the
need for a subsequent service agreement and contends that, "a contract that demonstrates an
intent to be bound by a future contract is the definition of an agreement to agree." ENA cites no
authority for this incorrect statement of the law. A so called "agreement to agree is one which is
not sufficiently complete in its material terms to enable the trier of fact to determine (1) what
acts are to be performed and (2) when performance is complete. Dale's Service Co. v. Jones, 96
Idaho 662, 664, 534 P .2d 1102, 1104 ( 197 5). The phrase "agreement to agree" is not itself a test
of enforceability, but is a conclusion reached by application of the proper test. Whether an
agreement contemplates a further written agreement is not determinative of the existence of a
current agreement. As stated in ATACS Corp. v. Trans World Communications, Inc.:
In many cases, the finalized subcontract between the parties to a
teaming agreement will specifically enumerate the scope of
obligations for each party contingent upon the prime contractor
winning the RFP so that there is usually little need to enforce the
teaming agreement itself. Often, however, the parties may reach an
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understanding to team, but fail to execute a subcontract as anticipated
in the teaming agreement. As with most other "preliminary
agreements" precedent to an executed contract ... the question arises
whether the teaming agreement itself, absent an executed subcontract,
may constitute the basis for contractual liability. Courts have
generally allowed such a cause of action in contract based solely on
the teaming agreement, but not without overcoming two major
obstacles: (1) the intent of the parties to enter into a binding
contractual relationship; and (2) the existence of sufficient objective
criteria to enforce.

***
The fact that the parties never finalized an implementing subcontract
is usually not fatal to enforcing the teaming agreement on its own-if
the parties intended the teaming agreement itself to constitute a
binding agreement that enumerated definite terms ofbehavior
governing the parties during, or even after, the binding process. Such
terms might include the subcontractor's assistance in the prime
contractor's proposal in return for the prime contractor's delivery of
an agreeable subcontract. Or, the parties might promise to work
exclusively with each other in preparing the bid for the government
contract. Of course, if the parties to a teaming agreement do not wish
to create binding obligations before executing an ultimate subcontract,
they need only say so. (Internal citations omitted and emphasis
added.)

ATACS Corp. v. Trans World Communications, Inc., 155 F.3d 659, 666-667 (3d Cir.
1998).
ENA argues the ATACS case is distinguishable because Trans World Airlines, the prime
contractor, received a contract for the entire project while ENA did not. This distinction is
immaterial. As noted above, Syringa provided firm pricing to ENA that allowed ENA to include
per unit and site specific pricing in its response to the RFP. The exact amount, sequence and
location of services the State required was not material to the Teaming Agreement. Syringa
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agreed to provide connectivity to ENA at its stated price without regard to the number of sites
selected for service, the volume requested, or the price received by ENA.
Qwest asserts the A TA CS case is "unhelpful" arguing that under Pennsylvania law "the
omission of an essential term in a contract, such as price does not vitiate contract formation .... "
ATACS at p. 667. (Qwest's Brief, p. 20.) Qwest misrepresents the ATACS court by quoting only

a portion of the subject sentence from ATACS. The entire quote, which is consistent with Idaho
law, reads: "Indeed, the omission of an essential term in a contract such as price does not vitiate
contract formation if the parties otherwise manifested their mutual asset to the agreement and the
terms of the agreement are sufficiently definite." (emphasis added). !d.
The Teaming Agreement was sufficiently definite even though a price was not included
within its four corners because Syringa's price to ENA was to be determined, and was in fact
determined, through the parties' performance of their ,]2( c) obligations in submitting a response
to the RFP. The details concerning the logistics of billing and related matters were also tied to
the correlating details of State terms and conditions so that the reference to "flow down
provisions" was sufficient to identify a process for completing these non-material terms.
4.

The Teaming Agreement Was Not Rendered Unenforceable By The RFP
Reservation of the Right to Make Multiple Awards.

ENA incorrectly asserts that ENA and Syringa could not contract beyond the submission
of the ENA Proposal because the "RFP reserved for the State the right to split the award".
(R. Vol. I, pp. 1875-79; RFP ,]2.0; ENA's Amended Brief, p. 16.) This argument is without
merit for at least three reasons:
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First, the RFP did not reserve a right to "split" the award. DOA reserved the right to
make a multiple award to up to four providers but specifically discouraged bids on part, but not
all of the lEN Project. 1 The RFP also required pricing to be submitted on a per unit basis so that
a multiple award could be accommodated. (R. 77, RFP Section 10.0.)
Second, the State is empowered to make multiple awards only for the same or similar
property and could not split theE-Rate and connectivity services. The reference to four
providers in the RFP could only lawfully mean awarding multiple contracts for the end-to-end
solution sought by the RFP (e.g., one provider for northern Idaho, one provider for southwest
Idaho and one provider for eastern Idaho).
Third, the DOA did not split the award when it issued the first SBPOs. It issued identical
contracts to ENA and to Qwest for the entire lEN Project which included E-Rate and
connectivity. This original ENA SBPO was a "prime contract" as defined in the Teaming
Agreement.
5.

The ENA Proposal Was Not Rejected by the Letter of Intent.

ENA claims the Teaming Agreement terminated by its terms on January 20, 2009
because "the State expressly rejected the lEN Alliance's offer to have Syringa provide the
connectivity portion of the lEN on a statewide basis." (ENA's Amended Brief, p. 20.) ENA's
argument is nonsense.
The argument is nonsense because despite the "lEN Alliance" name, the "lEN Alliance"
response to the RFP was ENA's proposal and ENA was to be the party contracting with the

SeeR. 1882, RFP § 3.2; R. 150-151, RFP A-15; see also R. 1892, RFP § 5.3.
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State. The statement is also nonsense because DOA did not expressly reject the ENA Proposal
and said nothing about rejecting Syringa connectivity on January 20, 2009. In fact, DOA
accepted the ENA Proposal and the Qwest proposal and issued identical SBPOs for the entire
lEN Project to each on January 28, 2009. Moreover, the acceptance of two proposals and the
issuance of two SBPOs was not a rejection of the ENA Proposal, but was, as discussed above, an
I.C. § 67-5718A multiple award that was contemplated by the RFP.
ENA seeks to mislead the Court into concluding that the parties intended their
participation in the lEN Project to be "all or nothing" by citing to statements of Greg Lowe, the
Syringa CEO, which acknowledge what no one disputes: that the Proposal was for an end-to-end
solution. IfENA and Syringa had not proposed an end-to-end solution, the Proposal would not
have been responsive. (ENA's Amended Brief, p. 22.) ENA's deception lies in its attempt to
equate the phrase "end-to-end solution" with "state-wide solution". None of the record citations
provided by ENA support its statement that the ENA Proposal was to be the sole statewide endto-end solution required by the RFP. For example, at page 23 of its Response Brief, ENA cites
the Affidavit of Greg Lowe for the proposition that the EN A/Syringa Proposal was for a "statewide" solution. (R. 568.) In fact, Greg Lowe testified:
13. Syringa and Education Networks of America, Inc. combined,
in response to recommendation in section 3.2 of the lEN RFP quoted
above, for the purpose of preparing a response to the lEN RFP and to
provide the "total end-to-end service support solution" solution the
RFP requested.
(R. 568.) The January 20, 2009 Letter of Intent accepted two proposals for end-to-end solutions
in a fashion that was consistent with the RFP and did not, therefore, vary from the ENA
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Proposal. The acceptance did not vary from the offer. The Letter of Intent and the first SBPOs
were actually an acceptance ofENA's Proposal.
6.

The Teaming Agreement Was Never Terminated by Rejection.

ENA argues that the Teaming Agreement "terminated by its own terms" because the
ENA (lEN Alliance) proposal was "twice rejected". (ENA's Amended Brief, p. 20.) It then
recites, but subsequently ignores the language or,[ 2(h) of the Teaming Agreement that concerns
termination.
Paragraph 2(h) of the Teaming Agreement states, "This agreement will terminate without
liability upon any of the following events:" It then lists a series of terminating events, including

,I 2(h)(i) "the customer formally and finally rejects the Proposal or cancels the Project"; ,I 2(h)(ii)
"Either party notifies the other that it is ceasing its efforts with respect to the Project, however
such a notification shall not absolve either party of its obligations under Section 2( e) and 2(g)
above"; and other events such as (iv) "mutual written agreement" that don't bear on the issues in
this case. The list of terminating events makes it apparent that the nature of the terminating
event has a direct impact on the post-termination obligations of the parties.
None of the obligations of the Teaming Agreement remain following termination because
"the customer formally and finally rejects the Proposal or cancels the Project" under ,I 2(h)(i) or
the agreement is terminated by mutual written agreement under ,[2(h)(iv). The ,[2(e) obligation
not to compete, or assist others to compete for the Project and the ,I 2(g) obligation not to
disclose Confidential Information, on the other hand, survive unilateral termination under

,I 2(h)(ii). The listing of five separate terminating events with two different kinds of post
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termination obligations makes it clear that the parties placed significance on the language used in
each.
The DOA decision to make a lawful multiple award (as suggested by the Letter oflntent
and the first SBPO) was not a rejection of the ENA Proposal because it would allow ENA (with
Syringa as subcontractor) to compete against Qwest site by site to provide "all services" to
selected schools and libraries under I.C. § 67-5718A (3). The split award (i.e, the amended
SBPOs), on the other hand, could have constituted a common law rejection of the ENA Proposal
if the ENA Proposal had not previously been accepted by the original SBPOs and if the amended
SBPOs did not violate I. C. § 67-5718A. Further, paragraph 2(h)(i) of the Teaming Agreement
did not provide that the Agreement terminated on any rejection. Paragraph 2(h)(i) of the
Teaming Agreement requires that a rejection be both formal and final.
Contract interpretation principles require the court construing a written instrument to
consider the instrument as a whole and to give meaning to all of the provisions of the writing to
the extent possible. Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 748, 9 P.3d 1204,
1214 (2000); Selkirk Seed Co. v. State Insurance Fund, 135 Idaho 434, 438, 18 P.3d 956, 960
(2000); Magic Valley Radiology Associates, P.A. v. Pro_fossional Business Services, Inc., 119
Idaho 558, 565,808 P.2d 1303, 1310 (1991). The plain meaning ofthe word "fonnally" does
not mean a rejection that occurs by operation oflaw. The word "finally" indicates that the
parties anticipated there could be give and take between ENA and the DOA before a final
contract was entered or EN A's proposal is "fonnally and finally" rejected.
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Construction of the Teaming Agreement as a whole reveals that the parties made a
distinction between formal and final rejection by the customer under paragraph 2(h)(i) and
voltmtary cessation of efforts under paragraph 2(h)(ii). If there is a formal and final rejection, all
obligations of the parties under the agreement cease. If, on the other hand, one of the parties
believes that the Proposal has been rejected and "ceases its efforts with respect to the Project", it
is still obligated, by the Teaming Agreement, to refrain from competing for the Project and not to
disclose Confidential Information.
Finally, the arguments made by ENA's lawyers ignore the inconsistent conduct and
statements of ENA leadership. ENA executive Bob Collie dealt extensively with DOA and with
Syringa concerning the Teaming Agreement and the lEN Project. Bob Collie also attended most,
if not all of the lEN meetings with Qwest that culminated in the amended SBPOs. Mr. Collie
treated the Teaming Agreement as if it was still effective as late as July, 2009. When Greg Lowe
complained to Mr. Collie on July 11, 2009, that he had been told by a state employee that ENA
had made the choice to use Qwest, Mr. Collie responded the same day by saying:
ENA has asked multiple times to have the ability to quote circuits
from multiple providers and have been told no each time. We have
also shared our teaming agreement with the state and have discussed
it in detail with OCIO and Admin leadership so there is no possibility
that they are confused about where we stand on the matter.
Furthermore, we have stated numerous times that the current
environment is not our preferred, normal or typical manner of doing
business nor is it the way that we bid in response to the State's RFP.

* * *
We continue to stand behind our teaming agr~ment, however at this
point we have no ability to implement its functions as we do not have
the ability to award a backbone or circuits outside of the state's
direction. (emphasis added)
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(July 11, 2009 Collie email, R. Conf. 142-143.)
Mr. Collie reiterated his understanding that the Teaming Agreement was still in effect on
July 27, 2009 when he again wrote to Syringa CEO Greg Lowe asking Syringa to agree to the
use of its circuits in Salmon. Mr. Collie stated:
We completely understand the need to protect Syringa's interests, but
your action last week does focus our attention on exactly how E)~"A
might proceed with its limited portion of this project since Syringa
has never formally declared the teaming agreement to have been
tenninated. Given the importance of the IEN to the State and your
continued support for ENA's continued preparations to implement its
assigned portion of this project, we assume that everyone
acknowledges that Syringa agrees with ENA moving forward in
accordance with its purchase order. As with the Salmon School
District, ENA intends to continue to press the State to use the
backbone offered by Syringa and its members' local loop options
despite the rejection of those portions of the RFP. We believe over
time we will prevail.
(July 11, 2009 Collie email, R. Conf. 165.)
At a minimum, genuine issues of material fact exist whether the issuance of a multiple
award as evidenced by the January 20, 2009 Letter of Intent and the January 28, 2009 SBPOs
was a "rejection" of the ENA Proposal as contemplated by the parties in the Teaming
Agreement. The February 26, 2009 amended SBPOs that "split" the award could not constitute a
rejection of the Proposal because the ENA Proposal had already been accepted by the original
SBPOs.
7.

ENA's "Alternative Grounds" Do Not Support Entry of Summary
Judgment.

ENA argues that its obligation to Syringa was excused because the DOA acted
unilaterally when it split the award by issuing the amended SBPOs. ENA relies on two different
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legal theories to support this argument. First, ENA asserts it was excused on the theory that the
award of connectivity work to ENA was a condition precedent to its Teaming Agreement
obligation to work with Syringa. Second, ENA argues that the alleged DOA unilateral decision
to split the award excuses ENA's performance under the doctrine of frustration of purpose.
In support of these theories, ENA states that "Syringa can point to no evidence that
creates any issue of fact that the State's decision regarding the Amendments was not unilateral."
ENA Response Brief at p. 25. ENA's assertion that the DOA acted unilaterally is dead wrong.
The DOA approached ENA after the original SBPO and asked ENA to work with Qwest. ENA
was under no obligation to acquiesce to DOA's request. Instead, and contrary to its obligations
under the Teaming Agreement, Bob Collie told Greg Zickau that the Teaming Agreement was
not an impediment and that ENA would do whatever the state asked ENA to do. (R. p. 2399,
Zickau Depo., p. 102, L. 6- p. 105, L. 25.). Consistent with doing whatever the state asked, Mr.
Collie met Qwest employee Clint Berry and ENA employee Bob Collie met on February 9, 2009
to discuss the pricing Qwest would charge for the very services ENA had agreed to acquire from
Syringa. (R. Conf. p. 166, Miller email; R. Conf. p. 156, Berry email.). ENA also met with
DOA officials and Qwest representatives multiple times in the interval between the original and
amended SBPOs. The record is devoid of any evidence that ENA told Syringa it was working
with Qwest. In fact,

E~A

did not even tell Syringa that the amended SBPOs had been entered.

As late as July of2009, ENA told Syringa it "continued to stand behind" the Teaming
Agreement. (R. Conf. pp. 142-146.) ENA's duplicity is strong evidence that its excuses are not
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raised in good faith. In short, ENA' s assertion that DOA acted unilaterally is simply not
supported by the record.
Because the record contains evidence that ENA facilitated or at least cooperated with the
DOA in splitting the Project through the amended SBPOs, neither the doctrine of frustration of
purpose nor ENA's condition precedent argument excuses its performance of the Teaming
Agreement. ENA argues that the doctrine of frustration of purpose applies alleging that the
"State's decision to issue the award to ENA and Qwest frustrated the object of the Teaming
Agreement." (ENA Brief, p. 28.) A quick examination of the argument, however, reveals that
ENA is actually making an impossibility of performance argument and, in fact, the Idaho Court
of Appeals case ENA cites is actually an impossibility of performance case. 2 A promisor is
relieved of its promise only if the promisor was not at fault for the event causing the "frustration
of purpose" or making performance impossible. (See Rstmt. 2d Contract§ 265; see also
17A Am Jur 2d, Section 660.)
Because ENA participated in the circumstance that allegedly prevents its performance,
neither the defense of impossibility of performance nor frustration of purpose is available to it.
Moreover, ENA made no effort to "surmount the obstacle" to performance. In fact, to the
contrary, ENA invited DOA's splitting of the award by telling the DOA it need not worry about
ENA's Teaming Agreement.
ENA cites Sutheimer v. Stoltenberg, 127 Idaho 81, 896 P.2d 989 (Ct. App. 1995) in support of its frustration of
purpose argument, but Suthemier is actually an impossibility of performance case. 127 Idaho at 85, 896 P.2d at
993. This court explained the distinction between the two defenses Twin Harbors Lumber Company v.
Carrico, 92 Idaho 343, 442 P. 2d 753 (1968), stating that the doctrine of impossibility excusing performance of
a contract provides generally that if the existence of a specific thing is essentially necessary for the performance
of a promise in the bargain, the promise will be discharged if the thing subsequently is not in existence in time
for performance. 92 Idaho at 348, 442 P. 2d at 758.
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For this same reason, ENA cannot escape its contractual obligation to Syringa on its
theory that the award of connectivity to ENA was a condition precedent to ENA's obligation to
use Syringa for that work. [W]hen the happening of the event is within the exclusive or partial
control of the party whose obligation is conditioned upon the event, its nonoccurrence will not
always excuse the obligor's performance." Wade Baker & Sons Farms, 136 Idaho 922, 935, 42
P.3d 715, 718 (Idaho App. 2002). (emphasis added). "Where a party has control over the
happening of a condition precedent, he must make a reasonable effort to cause the condition to
happen." Dengler, 141 Idaho at 129, 106 P.3d at 454; Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 474,
147 P.3d 100, 106; Schlueterv. Nelson, 74 Idaho 396,399,263 P.2d 386,387 (1953)). Where a
party is the cause of the failure of a condition precedent, he cannot take advantage of the failure.
Dengler v. Hazel Blessinger Family Trust, 141 Idaho 123, 129, 106 P.3d 449, 454 (2005) (citing
Fish v. Fleishman, 87 Idaho 126, 133, 391 P.2d 344, 348 (1964)). In this case the record
contains evidence from which a jury could reasonably determine that ENA participated in the
DOA decision to award connectivity to Qwest. ENA had the power to refuse DO A's attempts.
Not only could ENA have simply told the DOA "no," ENA had significant power and position
once it was named theE-rate provider. It would have been entirely appropriate for each to
exercise that power and position consistent with its contractual obligations to Syringa.
C.

Summary Judgment in Favor of Gwartney and Zickau was Improper.

The State Respondents argue that the district court should have granted summary
judgment in favor of Gwartney and Zickau because Syringa's Complaint failed to allege that
Gwartney and Zickau were not entitled to the immunity provided by Idaho Code§ 6-904(3).
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The State Respondents further argue that Syringa did not point to sufficient evidence to
overcome the presumption of immunity. The State Respondents' arguments are without merit.
1.

Syringa Was Not Required to Plead the Absence of Immunity.

The State Respondents argue that the Court should affirm the district court's grant of
summary judgment to Gwartney and Zickau because the Complaint does not allege facts to
overcome the State Defendants' statutory immunity. (State Respondents' Brief, p. 26.) This
appeal, however, is not from a Motion to Dismiss that challenges the sufficiency of the
pleadings. This appeal concerns the sufficiency of the evidence to overcome summary
judgment.
Nonetheless, "a complaint need not anticipate and overcome affirmative defenses.
61A Am Jur 2d Pleading§ 177; see id. § 136. Quite the opposite-a defendant bears the burden
of alleging and proving an affirmative defense, such as statutory immunity. See, e.g., Stuard v.

Jorgenson, 150 Idaho 701, 704,249 P.3d 1156, 1159 (2011) (defendant must prove affirmative
defense); S. Griffin Canst., Inc. v. Lewiston, 125 Idaho 181, 184, 16 P.3d 278,281 (2000)
(immunity is an affirmative defense); Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 470, 716 P.2d 1238, 1242
(1986); Fuhriman v. Dep 't ofTransp., 143 Idaho 800, 804, 153 P.3d 480, 483 (2007). Thus, the
Complaint is not deficient-Syringa was not required to anticipate and overcome the State
Respondents' as-yet-unpleaded defense ofimmunity. 3

As noted below, Plaintiff produced evidence overcoming the State Respondents' immunity defense. Yet the
State Respondents ask this Court to ignore that evidence and to affirm the district court's grant of summary
judgment on the grounds that the Complaint failed to state a claim. While the State Respondents' argument is
technically preserved, Syringa respectfully submits that the Court should review the summary judgment
decision before it. Should the Court entertain the State Respondents' argument that the Complaint failed to state
a claim because it failed to allege the absence of immunity, Syringa should be provided the opportunity to
amend the Complaint pursuant to I.R.C.P. 15 to conform to the evidence presented on summary judgment.
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The State respondents rely upon Myers v. Pocatello, 98 Idaho 168, 559 P.2d 1136 (1977),
in support of their argument that Syringa was required to plead the facts (such as malice) that are
necessary to overcome statutory immunity. The citation, however, is misleading. Myers was an
action for malicious prosecution. The allegation that the "defendant was actuated by malice" is
an essential element of the prima facia case of the tort of malicious prosecution. 98 Idaho at
169, 559 P.2d at 113 7. The court properly dismissed the complaint in Myers tor failure to allege
the elements of the underlying tort claim; not for failure to plead facts that anticipated the
affirmative defense of immunity. Myers is not apposite and Syringa is not required to plead
"malice", criminal intent, or other facts necessary to overcome Gwartney and Zickau' s alleged
affirmative defense of immunity. In other words, Syringa was under no obligation to anticipate
and refute DOA's affinnative defense.
Even if Syringa was required to allege that Gwartney and Zickau acted outside the course
and scope of their employment, with malice, or with criminal intent, reasonable inferences drawn
from the Complaint meet this requirement. Count Four of Syringa's Complaint realleged
foregoing paragraphs of the Complaint, which included paragraphs 40 (Gwartney and Zickau
agreed with Qwest officials to contract with Qwest despite the evaluation team conclusions), 45
through 50 (Gwartney and Zickau instructed ENA and others not to use Syringa for IEN
implementation regardless of the competitive bid process, consideration of price and other
statutory factors), and 69 through 76 (Gwartney and Zickau conspired with Qwest to amend the
IEN Purchase Orders in violation ofidaho Code§ 67-5718A and to deprive Syringa of an
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acquisition award in violation ofldaho Code §67-5726). At a minimum, these allegations
support an inference of criminal intent.
Criminal intent is present when "the defendant knowingly performed the proscribed acts.
State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 64 P.3d 296, 303 (2002) citing State v. Stiffler, 117 Idaho 405,

406,788 P.2d 220,221 (1990). "The word 'intent' as used in criminal statutes does not mean the
intent to commit a crime, but the intent knowingly to perform the interdicted act." State v.
Booton, 85 Idaho 51, 37 5 P .2d 536 (1962) (emphasis added); see also Anderson v. City of
Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176,182,731 P.2d 171,187 (1987) ("[criminal intent] involves the

intentional commission of a wrongful or unlawful act without legal justification or excuse.")
(emphasis added). The allegation that Gwartney and Zickau conspired to split the lEN award in
violation ofldaho Code §67-5718A and to deprive Syringa of an acquisition award in violation
of Idaho Code §67 -5726 supports an inference of criminal intent in that they knowingly split the
lEN Project and knowingly excluded Syringa from providing the services it contracted to
provide in the Teaming Agreement. 4
The same allegations support an inference of malice as a form of criminal intent plus ill
without regard to intent to injure. Anderson, supra.
Syringa's complaint is fully sufficient.

The district court erroneously ruled, without citation to authority, that Syringa was precluded from relying upon
the issuance of the amended SBPOs and violation ofldaho Code§ 67-5718A as the "proscribed act" for
purposes of criminal intent because it had concluded that Syringa was barred, by failure to exhaust
administrative remedies from challenging the amended SBPOs. The State Respondents have not addressed this
issue which was raised by Syringa in its Opening Brief. (Syringa's Opening Brief, p 48).
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2.

Gwartney and Zickau's Claims of Immunity Present Genuine Issues of
.Material Fact.

The State Respondents claim that Syringa failed to present facts sufficient to create a
genuine issue of material fact sufficient to overcome the presumption that the conduct of
Gwartney and Zickau was immune under Idaho Code§ 6-904(3). While it is true that Idaho
Code§ 6-904(3) creates a "rebuttable presumption that any act or admission of employee within
the time and at the place of his employment is within the course and scope of his employment
and without malice or criminal intent'", the standard is not so onerous as the State Respondents
contend. Anderson v. Spalding, 137 Idaho, 509, 519, 50 P.3d 1004, 1014 (2002).
The State Respondents and the district court overstate the burden of overcoming the
Idaho Code § 6-904 presumption by misreading Boise Tower Assoc. LLC v. Hoagland, 14 7
Idaho 774, 784,215 P.3d 494, 504 (2009), for the proposition that the burden is "particularly
high." (R. 2583.) That case did not change the evidentiary burden for overcoming the
presumption of Idaho Code § 6-904; it simply noted that the burden on a plaintiff challenging an
act of a state employee is "particularly high" because of the presumption. The district court
statement in this regard that "Syringa must demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material
fact sufficient to overcome the statutory presumption" is in error. (R. 2583.) Syringa was
required only to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning the
exceptions to immunity. Whether the facts are sufficient is for the jury to decide.
The State Respondents do not dispute, but do not state clearly, that the Idaho Code § 6904 presumption is rebutted if the subject employee acts outside the course and scope ofhis or
her employment; or acts with malice; or acts with criminal intent. Put simply, a state employee
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is not immune from liability for tortious conduct undertaken outside the scope of employment.
Similarly a state employee is not immune from liability for tortious conduct undertaken with
criminal intent, or undertaken with malice. The district court erred to the extent that it treated the
exceptions conjunctively. (R. 2584.)
Syringa acknowledges it was required to come forward with admissible evidence to
demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact whether Gwartney and Zickau acted
with criminal intent or malice and asserts that the evidence is in the Record. By the same token,
the Record does not present evidence that Gwartney and Zickau were acting outside the scope of
their employment when they acted with Qwest to amend the lEN Purchase Orders in violation of
Idaho Code§ 67-5718A and to deprive Syringa of an acquisition award in violation ofldaho
Code§ 67-5726.
The record is replete with admissible evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer
that Gwartney and Zickau acted with criminal intent to violate the requirements of Idaho Code
§ 67-5718A and to deprive Syringa of an acquisition award in violation ofldaho Code§ 675726. Much of that evidence is circumstantial; but direct evidence is rarely available to prove
intent. Highland Enterprises, Inc., v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 340, 986 P.2d 996, 1006 (1999)
(What motivates a person to act is seldom susceptible of direct proof; intent may be established
by inference as well as by direct proof.) Further, circumstantial evidence that is admissible is
sufficient to create a material issue of fact. See Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 150 Idaho 664,
249 P.3d 857 (2011); Banner Life Ins. Co., v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho
117, 206 P.3d 481 (2009).
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Evidence of criminal intent or malice on the part of Mr. Gwartney begins with his
admission that he knew, at least as early as January 20, that Qwest would be providing lEN
connectivity. (Syringa's Opening Brief, pp. 14-15.) This testimony is corroborated by the
testimony of Qwest employee Clint Berry who testified "I knew all along we (Qwest) were going
to be providing connectivity" (Syringa's Opening Brief, p. 15.)
Greg Zickau's testimony to the effect that he recommended making a multiple award
during the January 16, 2009 telephone call following the completion of the technical evaluation,
made the decision to award connectivity to Qwest, and doesn't recall who initiated the amended
SBPOs must be evaluated in light of the foregoing testimony by Mr. Gwartney and Clint Berry
and raises an inference that Mr. Zickau is a co-conspirator and "team player" whose testimony is
designed to protected Mr. Gwartney. (See Zickau Depo. P. 179 L. 9- P. 180 L. 2, R. Conf. 108;
P. 92 L. 5- P. 93 L. 21, R. Conf. 107; P. 76 L. 2- L. 7, R. Conf. 105).

Gwartney's self-knowledge of guilt may also be inferred from the destruction of evidence
on his computer. (R. 1991-2011, Affidavit ofMerlyn Clark). Although a question remains
whether the destruction of Mr. Gwartney's computer files rises to the level of deserving a
presumptive spoliation instruction, evidence of the fact that Mr. Gwartney's calendars for the
months of January and February are clean and devoid of appointments unlike all other months is
unexplained and supports an inference that evidence was destroyed. (Gwartney Depo., p. 286 L.
2- p. 294, L. 25; R. Conf. 374-375; Gwartney Calendar, R. Conf. 00324- 000362.)
Further evidence in the record that creates genuine issues of material fact and from which
a jury could reasonably infer the existence of criminal intent and malice on the part of Gwartney
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and Zickau is summarized in Plaintiffs Statement of Material Facts in Support of Response to
Defendants' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment (R. Conf. 1-31) and supported by the
documents and testimony attached to the Affidavit of David R. Lombardi In Support of
Plaintiffs Opposition to Motions for Partial Summary Judgment (R. Conf. 73-301 ). This
evidence proves that Gwartney and Zickau knew about the Teaming Agreement (R. Conf. 5-7);
that Gwartney threatened to cut Syringa out from lEN business if the Syringa CEO "didn't keep
his opinions to himself' (R. Conf. 8-9); that at least one of the evaluators believed there was bias
against Syringa 5 (R. Conf. 9-1 0); that ENA officials had the present impression that "Gwartney
and Zickau "are ... under some kind of need to give Qwest this deal. .. " (R. Conf. 10-11) 6 ; that
Gwartney and Zickau engaged in multiple closed door meetings with Qwest and ENA they could
not remember but which resulted in changes to the Strategic Implementation Plan that morphed
from including Syringa to the total exclusion of Syringa (R. Conf. 11-23); and that the decision
to make a split award separating E-rate services from cmmectivity services was made before the
technical evaluation team conducted its evaluation. (R. Conf. 23-27.)
The record also contains evidence that brings the credibility of Gwartney, Zickau, state
witnesses Teresa Luna, Mark Little, Laura Hill and ENA witness Bob Collie into question.
(Plaintiffs Opening Brief, p. 31 ;Exhibits to the Clerk's Record, Roden Exhibits 2 - 3 and
R. Conf. 488-513). This evidence precludes strict reliance on the printed version of the testimony

This evidence was erroneously excluded by the district court as inadmissible; it is not hearsay, but is a statement
of existing state of mind of the declarant under IRE 803(3).
This evidence was also erroneously excluded by the district court as inadmissible; it is not hearsay, but is either
an admission of a party opponent (ENA) under IRE 801 (d) or a statement of existing state of mind under
IRE 803(3).
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of the above individuals whose demeanor, failures of memory, evasiveness and presentation
present an issue of credibility that can only be resolved by the jury.
Summary judgment and dismissal of Count 4 of Syringa's claims against Gwartney and
Zickau was and would be error.
D.

Genuine Issues of Fact Preclude the Entry of Summary Judgment to Qwest.
Qwest advances three principal arguments to support the dismissal of Syringa's

interference claims: (1) ENA and Syringa did not have binding agreement with which Qwest
could interfere; (2) Qwest's interference with the Teaming Agreement was not "improper" and
was therefore not actionable; and (3) the DOA acted unilaterally and, therefore, Qwest did not
actually interfere.
As to the first point, whether the Teaming Agreement was sufficiently definite in its
terms to be enforceable presents questions of fact to be resolved by the jury. See Section II. B.
above.
Qwest's second point relates to the law and to the facts. On the law, Qwest confuses the
tort of interference with contract with the tort of interference with prospective economic
advantage. The tort of interference with contract has four elements: "( 1) the existence of a
contract; (2) knowledge of the contract on the part of the defendant; (3) intentional interference
causing a breach of the contract; and (4) injury to the plaintiff resulting from the breach. Wesco

Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 895,243 P.3d 1069, 1083 (2010); see also
Barlow v. Int'l Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881, 893, 522 P.2d 1102, 1114 (1974). The tort of
interference with economic advantage adds an element that the interference must be "wrongful
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by some means beyond the fact of the interference itself." The Idaho First Nat 'l Bank v. Bliss
Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 286, 824 P.2d 841, 861 (1992).

Once the above elements are established, the burden shifts to the defendant to explain the
interference. Wesco, 895 Idaho at 895, 243, P.3d at 1083. Whether the defendant is able to
establish justification is evaluated under a multiple factor test summarized in the Restmt.
(Second) ofTorts at§ 766A. Wesco, 895 Idaho at 895,243, P.3d at 1083. The evaluation of
these factors is not for the purpose of determining "wrongfulness, but rather "[w]eighing the
above factors in each individual case involves a complex interplay between overlaying public
interests." Id. and is "ordinarily for the jury to determine .... " Barlow, 95 Idaho at 893, 522
P .2d at 1114. The test, in summary, is not ''wrongfulness" but one of balancing interests to
determine whether the interference was justified or privileged. The burden is not on Syringa to
establish the absence of justification or privilege.
Qwest' s selective recitation of facts (Qwest Brief, pp. 21-24, 28-29) which draws
inferences in support of Qwest contrary to the requirements of Rule 56 does not establish, as a
matter of law, that its interference was justified or privileged. Given the strong public policy in
Idaho Code§ 67-5726(3) against inf1uencing an award of a public contract (and the fact that it is
illegal for a public officer to do so (Idaho Code § 67-5726(2)), Qwest has not established that its
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interference was justified or privileged. 7 At a minimum, the question of justification or privilege
is a question for the jury on the evidence in this case.
As to Qwest's third point, Qwest fails to establish that the DOA "unilaterally" issued the
amended SBPOs because the record contains undisputed evidence ofQwest's involvement and
direct interference with the Teaming Agreement. As noted above in connection with Gwartney
and Zickau, evidence in the record that creates genuine issues of material fact and from which a
jury could reasonably infer intentional interference by Qwest is summarized in Plaintiffs
Statement of Material Facts in Support ofResponse to Defendants' Motions for Partial Summary
Judgment (R. Conf. 1-31) and supported by the documents and testimony attached to the
Affidavit of David R. Lombardi In Support of Plaintiffs Opposition to Motions for Partial
Summary Judgment (R. Conf. 73-301 ). That evidence proves that as of January 30, Qwest was
"on the defensive and wants much more" (R. Conf. 17-23); that Qwest, ENA and DOA officials
met in closed-door meetings on over thirteen occasions, including a meeting at the Bitter Creek
lounge in Boise where Qwest received advance notice that ENA would be selected as theE-Rate
provider, exchanged multiple e-mails and letters including "detailed circuit pricing" emails, and
engaged in discussions concerning pricing on February 9 and 10, 2009 before the amended
SBPO's were issued; (R. Conf. 11-17; Berry Deposition, p. 154, L. 4- p. 162, L. 18, R. Conf.
439-440); and that Qwest pressured ENA, in the presence of Mr. Zickau, to become a
subcontractor to Qwest (R. Conf. 7-8; 27-30.)
Qwest's subversion of the open and competitive bidding process likely also meets the "wrongful by some means
other than the interference itself necessary as a part of Syringa's prima fact case for interference with
prospective economic advantage. Because a binding contract existed between ENA and Syringa, Syringa's
focus in this brief is on that tort. Syringa does not, however, waive its claim for interference with prospective
economic advantage.
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The evidence of what occurred at the lEN meetings involving Qwest is incomplete
because the participants have an astonishing lack of recall. The evidence that does exist,
however, reflects that in the course of these meetings and communications: Qwest met with
ENA and the DOA to re-work the prices at which it would provide connectivity services because
Qwest, the DOA and ENA all knew that Qwest's prices exceeded Syringa's (R. Conf. 166, 171,
173, 174, 185); Qwest wrote language for the amended SBPOs which allocated the connectivity
work to Qwest (R. Conf. 174-175); Laura Hill used nearly identical language to language
provided by Qwest in the amended SBPOs (R. 1602, L. 9- 1603, L. 11; R. Conf. 463-64)
(Supplemental Affidavit ofDavid R.

Lombardi,~

21, Exhibit 18, R. Conf. 302-487 at 484;

R. Conf. 147-155 at 148 and amended Qwest SBPO, R. 586-589 at 588-589; That Bob Collie,
who participated in the closed door meetings on behalf of ENA, reported EN A's relationship was
in jeopardy due to pressure from Qwest and that Mike Gwartney and Greg Zickau were under
some kind of need to give Qwest this deal or appease them at a minimum. (R. 166.) and Qwest
employee Clint Berry "knew all along" that Qwest would be providing connectivity.
There are, in short, genuine issues of material fact that preclude the entry of summary
judgment dismissing Syringa's interference claims against Qwest.

E.

Attorney Fees.
1.

The District Court Correctly Denied Fees to The State Respondents.

The district court properly denied the State Respondents' request for attorney fees under
Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) and§ 12-121 under this Court's holding in Potlatch Education Ass 'n v.

Potlatch School District #285, 148 Idaho 630, 226 P.3d 1277 (2010). (See Memorandum
Decision and Order on Attorneys Fees attached to Syringa's December 21, 2011 Motion to
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Augment the Record to Include Content Required by I.A.R. 28(b )( 1), at page 20). The district
court also properly denied fees under Idaho Code§ 12-117(1) because Syringa's claims were not
unreasonable. Id.
(a)

Potlatch and six subsequent cases squarely held that "Idaho Code
§ 12-117(1) is the exclusive means for awarding attorney fees for the
entities to which it applies."

In Potlatch, the plaintiffs sued a school district for breach of contract. The school district
prevailed on appeal and sought attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-117(1) and§ 12-121. Id. at
634,226 P.3d at 1282. This Court denied fees under§ 12-117(1) because the plaintiffs' appeal
was not unreasonable. I d. It also denied fees under § 12-121 "because I. C. § 12-117 is the
exclusive means for awarding attorney fees for the entities to which it applies." Id. (citing
Westway Canst., Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dep't, 139 Idaho 107, 116,73 P.3d 721,730 (2003)).

The Potlatch rule concerning the exclusivity of Idaho Code § 12-117 has been affirmed
no less than six times. See Arambarri v. Armstrong, 2012 WL 739486, at *6 (Idaho March 8,
2012); City of Osburn v. Randel, 2012 WL 1434339, at *4 (Idaho April26, 2012); KeplerFleenor v. Fremont Cnty., 152 Idaho 207,268 P.3d 1159, 1165 (2012); Smith v. Washington
Cnty., 150 Idaho 388,392,247 P.3d 615,619 (2010); Brown v. Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802,811,

229 P .3d 1164, 1173 (201 0); Sopatyk v. Lemhi Cnty., 151 Idaho 809, 264 P .3d 916, 925 (2011).
These cases settle the matter. Yet the State Respondents argue that the Court's language
in Potlatch was dicta and therefore not binding. (State Respondents' Brief, p. 41). Not so.
Dicta is "[a] judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion that is unnecessary to the
decision in the case and therefore not precedential (although it may be considered persuasive)."
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BLACK'S LAW DICTIO~ARY, Obiter Dictum (3d ed.); see St. Luke's Magic Valley Reg'! Med.
Cntr., Ltd. v. Bd. ofCnty. Comm 'rs, 91 Idaho 338, 595, 237 P.3d 1210, 1221 (2010). In
Potlatch, the Court denied fees under§ 12-121 only because§ 12-117 is exclusive. See 148

Idaho at 632, 226 P.3d at 1279. The exclusivity of§ 12-117 was absolutely necessary to resolve
the attorney-fcc issue. Hence, the Court's interpretation of§ 12-117 is not dicta.
The State Respondents also argue that this Court did not mean what it said in Potlatch.
(Sec State Respondents' Brief, p. 40-43). According to the State Respondents, Potlatch stands
only for the proposition that § 12-1 17 displaces § 12-121; it docs not preclude an award of fees
under§ 12-120(3). Id. at 42. But the Court's rationale was clear: "LC. § 12-117 is the exclusive
means for awarding attorney's fees for the entities to which it applies." Potlatch, 148 Idaho at
635,225 P.3d at 1282 (emphasis added). 8
(b)

This Court should not overrule Potlatch.

Stare decisis has long been a staple of American jurisprudence. "[This Court] shall not

stray from the principle of stare decisis without an exceptionally compelling reason to do so,
particularly where doing so would be a move to embrace ambiguity over order." Idaho Falls v.
Fuhriman, 149 Idaho 574, 579,237 P.3d 1200, 1205 (2010). Stare decisis serves many

purposes, including "sparing [litigants] the necessity of rclitigating every relevant proposition in
every case" and preventing "the sheer impossibility of reexamining de novo every relevant
proposition in every case." Bethke v. Idaho Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 93 Idaho 410, 412-13, 462 P.2d

In any event, Smith v. rYashington County and Westway Construction, Inc. v. Idaho Transp.
139 Idaho
I 07, 116, 73 P.3d 721 (2003), each held that § 12-117 precludes fees under § 12-120(3). Thus, even if the
Court's language in Potlatch were not clear, there is no merit to DO A's argument that § 12-117(1) does not
preclude fees under§ 12-120(3).
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502, 505-06 (1969) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The State Respondents'
cross-appeal squarely implicates both concerns-it attempts tore-litigate an issue that has been
decided six times in the past two years and invites the Court to reexamine a settled point oflaw.
Of course, stare decisis is not an unbending rule. "Stare decisis requires this Court to
follow controlling precedent unless it is manifestly wrong, proven to be unjust or unwise, or
overruling it is necessary in light of obvious principles of law and justice." Sopatyk v. Lemhi
Cnty., 151 Idaho 809, ---, 264 P.3d 916, 926 (2011). 9 Potlatch was not manifestly incorrect,

however, nor is there an obvious principle of law and justice at stake.
(i)

Potlatch is not manifestly incorrect.

Just last year this Court refused to overrule Potlatch. See Sopatyk, 151 Idaho 809, 264
P.3d at 926. Thus, in a sense the State Respondents are doubly barred by stare decisis--on the
merits by Potlatch itself, and on its

argum~nt

to overrule Potlatch by Sopatyk. Further, the State

Respondents are unable to demonstrate that Potlatch was manifestly incorrect.
First, the State Respondents' argument that the legislature did not intend to make§ 12117(1) the exclusive authority for awarding fees in favor of a state agency is suspect at best.
(State Respondents' Brief, p. 39.) The State Respondents cite the Statement of Purpose for the
bill that amended § 12-117(1) in 2000.JO But the cited Statement of Purpose actually
demonstrates the opposite. It provides,
Idaho law presently allows for the recovery of attorney fees against
public agencies in cases where the public agency frivolously pursues
Fittingly, in Sopatyk the Court held that Potlatch should not be overruled in light of principles of stare decisis.
10

In 2000, the legislature amended § 12-117(1) to allow an award of fees in favor of state agencies against private
persons. See 2000 S.L, Ch. 234, § 1 (changing "person" to "prevailing party"). It also added the prefatory
language, ·'Unless otherwise provided by statute." Id.
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or defends the administrative action or civil judicial proceeding.
There is no general provision for an award of attorney fees in favor of
the public agency where the other party to the action frivolously
pursues or defends the administrative or civil action.
(State Respondents' Brief, p. 39 (emphasis added) (citing 2000 S.L. Ch. 241, sec. 1.)
Thus, the Idaho legislature indicated in 2000, notwithstanding Idaho Code§ 12-121,
there was no basis other than Idaho Code § 12-117 for an award of fees to public agencies
against adverse parties that took unreasonable litigation positions. Accordingly, in the "mind" of
the Idaho legislature, § 12-117 became the exclusive means by which a public agency could
obtain fees for frivolous litigation.
The same result is apparent by comparison of the language of§ 12-117, § 12-120, and
§ 12-121. Read in isolation, § 12-120 and § 12-121 apparently allow fees in favor of a public
entity. But statutes must be read in conjunction, not isolation. See Flying Elk Investment, LLC v.
Cornwall, 149 Idaho 9, 16, 232 P.3d 330, 336 (2010). Also, the Court has developed rules of

construction to resolve conflicting statutes: "When two statutes conflict, the more specific statute
controls over the more general." Paterson v. State, 128 Idaho 494, 502, 915 P.2d 724, 732
(1996) (citation omitted). Section 12-117 specifically governs the award of attorney fees in civil
proceedings between a person and state agencies. Hence, it is the more specific statute that
controls in the event of a conflict with the general attorney-fee statutes, § § 12-120 and 12-121,
and the apparent conflict does not establish that Potlatch was manifestly incorrect.
Third, the State Respondents' proposed interpretation would render either§ 12-121 or the
relevant section of§ 12-117 duplicative and superfluous. "[T]he Court must give effect to all the
words and provisions of the statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant." State v.
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Schulz, 151Idaho 863,---,264 P.3d 970,973 (2011) (citation omitted). If§ 12-121 and§ 12-

117 applied to the same case, § 12-121 would permit an award of fees for frivolous litigation
positions while§ 12-117 would

such an award.

Fourth, State Respondents argue that the phrase "Unless otherwise provided by statute"
refers to § 12-120(3) and § 12-121 and engrafts the general attorney-fee regime onto cases
governed by§ 12-117. (State Respondents' Brief, p. 45.) But the prefatory language does not
operate in this manner. At its core, § 12-117(1) reads, "Unless otherwise provided by statute ...
the court shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees ... if it finds that the
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." I. C. § 12-117(1) (emphasis
added). Thus, in cases to which § 12-117(1) applies, an award of fees for unreasonable litigation
positions is mandatory-"[ u]nless otherwise provided by statute." The prefatory language does
not incorporate the general attorney-fee regime; it simply permits the legislature to establish a
different attorney-fee regime to subsets of cases in which§ 12-117(1) would otherwise require
an award of fees. Idaho Code§ 6-918A is an example.
Fifth and finally, the State Respondents argue that "this Court has continued to award
fees to state agencies pursuant to § 12-120(3) or § 12-121 even ajier the Pot latch decision."
(State Respondents' Brief, p. 44.) Specifically, the State Respondents incorrectly contend that
this Court "award[ed] attorney fees to Hagerman Highway District pursuant to§ 12-121" in
Zingiber Investment, LLC v. Hagerman Highway District, 150 Idaho 675, 249 P.3d 868 (2011 ).
ld. at 44. 1n fact, this Court stated: "the district court properly awarded attorney fees to the
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[Hagerman Highway] District under I. C. § 12-117 .... " Id. at 686, 249 P.3d at 879 (emphasis
added). 11
The State Respondents argue that this Court awarded fees under§ 12-120(3) to a staterun university in Sadid v. Idaho State University, 265 P.3d 1144, 1154 (2011). (State
Respondents' Brief, p. 44.) That is correct. But universities are not subject to§ 12-117(1). See
Horne v. Idaho State Univ., 138 Idaho 700, 706, 69 P.3d 120, 126 (2003). Thus, Sadid does not
conflict with Potlatch.
Finally, 12 the State Respondents cite Doe v. Idaho Department ofHealth & We(fare, 150
Idaho 491, 497, 248 P.3d 742, 748 (2011). In Doe, this Court granted fees to the Department of
Health and Welfare under § 12-121. See id. The award conflicts with Potlatch. But the Does
apparently did not present an argument that Potlatch prohibited a fee award under§ 12-121. 13
Thus, Doe likely stands only for the proposition that the Court will not decide a case based on
arguments not presented to it. In any event, the existence of a single anomalous case does not
prove that Potlatch was manifestly incorrect. No obvious principle of justice requires Potlatch
to be overruled.
Idaho courts must adhere to precedent unless it is manifestly incorrect or "overruling it is
necessary in light of obvious principles of law and justice." Sopatyk, 151 Idaho 809, 264 P .3d at
II

The Court awarded fees to LynCiif, a private party, under I.C. § 12-121. See Zingiber Inv., 150 Idaho at 686,
249 P.3d at 879. This holding is consistent with Potlatch, because § 12-117(1) does not apply to litigation
between private parties.

12

The State Respondents also cite Stoddard v. Pocatello School Dist. #25, 149 Idaho 679,687, 239 P.3d 784, 79293 (20 10). In Stoddard, the Court declined to award fees to the school district. Thus, Stoddard does not
conflict with Potlatch, although the Court technically should have denied fees under§ 12-117 instead of§ 12121.

13

The briefs in Doe were sealed. Accordingly, counsel could not defmitely determine whether the § 12-117(1)
issue was argued in that case.
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926. As this Court recently stated, "there is no obvious principle of justice at stake here....
Since Idaho follows the 'American Rule' for attorney's fees, no fee awards are available absent
contractual or statutory authority." Sopatyk, 151 Idaho 809, 264 P.3d at 926. The State
Respondents fail to identifY an obvious principle of law or justice that requires Potlatch to be
overruled. Hence, Potlatch is binding under principles of stare decisis.
(c)

The District Court properly denied fees under Idaho Code§ 12117(1).

The State Respondents argue that it is entitled to attorney fees under § 12-117(1) because
Syringa brought this case without standing, failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and had no
evidence to support its tortious interference claim. (State Respondents' Brief, p. 54.) But
Syringa has, to the contrary, demonstrated in this brief and its Opening Brief, that it was not
required to exhaust administrative remedies in order to challenge the amended SBPOs and that
its tortious interference claims are well supported with admissible evidence. The district court
specifically found that Syringa's claims were reasonable: "Based upon its review of the entire
record, the Court cannot find that Syringa acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law."
(Memorandum and Order re: Costs and Attorneys' Fees, p. 22.) The State Respondents have not
established that Syringa's claims are unreasonable. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the
denial of fees under§ 12-117(1) and deny the State Respondents' attorneys' fees on appeal
should they prevail. 14

14

The State Respondents do not present any argument that it is entitled to fees under Idaho Code§ 6-918A.
Accordingly, any such argument is waived and the Court must affirm the district court's decision on this issue.
2012).
Ball v. City of Blackfoot,--- Idaho---, 273 P.3d 1266, 1271 (Idaho March

-45-

2.

No "Commercial Transaction" Took Place Between Qwest and Syringa.

The district court did not identifY a commercial transaction between Syringa and Qwest.
Nonetheless, it granted fees because both Qwest and Syringa participated in the "larger
commercial transaction" of the lEN bidding process. (Memorandum Decision and Order re:
Costs and Attorneys' Fees, p. 13.) This holding is erroneous and requires reversal if the
dismissal of Syringa's Complaint against Qwest is affirmed.
Until recently, tort claims could not support an award of fees under Idaho Code§ 12120(3). See Soignier v. Fletcher, 151 Idaho 322, ---, 256 P.3d 730, 735 (2011) (describing this
history). Now, a prevailing party may obtain fees for claims sounding in tort or contract, so long
as a ~·commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit," without regard to whether
the claim sounds in tort or contract. Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat 'lAss 'n, 141 Idaho 362, 368, 109
P .3d 1104, 1110 (2005). In short, Idaho law has shifted from a claims-based to a transactionbased approach.
While a party can recover on a tort claim based on a commercial transaction, the
commercial transaction must still have occurred between the prevailing party and the nonprevailing party. See Soignier, 256 P.3d at 734 (''[The] commercial transaction occurred
between the prevailing party and the party from whom that party seeks fees." (emphasis added)).
Several recent cases illustrate this requirement. In Jacklin Land Co. v. Blue Dog RV, Inc., 151
Idaho 242, ---, 254 P.3d 1238, 1246 (2011), the Court denied fees to the defendants (Blue Dog
and KL Properties) against the plaintiff (Jacklin) because "Blue Dog entered into a commercial
transaction with KL Properties, and KL Properties entered into a commercial transaction with [a
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third party], but there is nothing in the record indicating that either Defendant entered into a
commercial transaction with Jacklin." In Hopkins Northwest Fund, LLC v. Landscapes
Unlimited, LLC, 151 Idaho 740, ---, 264 P.3d 379, 387 (2011) this Court denied fees to the

defendant (Hopkins) against the plaintiff (LU) because "there was a transaction between LU and
HPGC, and a separate transaction between HPGC and Hopkins, but there was no commercial
transaction between LU and Hopkins." InBECO Construction Co. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 145
Idaho 719,726, 184 P.3d 844,851 (2008), the Court denied fees to the defendant (J-U-B) against
the plaintiff (BECO) because "[t]he case at bar clearly involved a 'commercial transaction'
within the meaning ofl.C. § 12-120(3), but the transaction was between the City and BECO and
not between J-U-B and BECO." See also Sadid v. Idaho State Univ., 151 Idaho 932, ---,265
P.3d 1144, 1154 (2011) ("However, the other Defendants cannot recover attorney fees under[§
12-120(3)] unless Plaintiff alleged a claim seeking to recover on a commercial transaction with
them." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). It is not sufficient that the parties were involved in
a larger commercial transaction.
The district court erred because there was no commercial transaction between Qwest and
Syringa. This Court's statements in Jacklin, Hopkins, and J-U-B apply equally to this case.
There was a commercial transaction between Syringa and ENA, a commercial transaction
between ENA and the State, and a commercial transaction between Qwest and the State, but
there was no commercial transaction between Qwest and Syringa. Accordingly, the district court
erred by granting fees to Qwest. Notably, the analysis contained in Qwest' s Brief does not
identify a commercial transaction between it and Syringa and suffers from the same deficiencies.
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Qwest also seeks an award of fees under§ 12-121. Qwest's Briefat 38-39. The district
court did not address this argument. As noted above, the Teaming Agreement is enforceable and
Syringa produced evidence of interference with that contract by Qwest. Accordingly, Syringa's
claim was not baseless, and the Court should deny fees under§ 12-121 as well.
III. CONCLUSION

The district court decisions granting Defendants· motions for summary judgment
dismissing Count Two, Count Three, Count Four and Count Five of Syringa's Complaint should
be reversed and remanded for further proceedings. In addition, the district court decision
awarding attorneys' fees to Qwest should be reversed, the award of attorneys fees to ENA should
be vacated pending further proceedings, and this Court should award Syringa reasonable costs
and attorneys' fees incurred in bringing this appeal against EN A.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of June, 2011:/~~,
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